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You are a typical brokerage client headed into a typical brokerage firm.1
You feel that you have a handle on stocks, but bonds strike you as more of a 
mystery.2 You have heard that diversification would be wise, but you do not feel 
that you know how to go about creating a diversified portfolio.3 The brokerage 
firm assigns you to the stockbroker of the day. 4 The broker shows you an 
investment profile questionnaire that asks you questions about your investment 
knowledge, investment experience, investment objectives, federal tax bracket, 
 
1 See National Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] Investor Information: The New 
Account Agreement (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information” hyperlink; 
then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Invest Wisely” hyperlink) (last visited 
April, 23, 2006) (describing the typical services of a full-service brokerage firm); cf. Peter M. 
Mundheim, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: Challenges Facing 
the Industry Regulators in the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 242 n.2 (1995) 
(describing the common brokerage relationship). 
2 The inverse relationship that bonds have with interest rates can be a mental hurdle for many 
clients.  When interest rates rise, bonds decline in value.  The reasoning behind this concept can 
be made fairly simple through an example.  Imagine you purchase a bond paying 5% interest.  
Interest rates rise and now a bond of the same length and risk as your bond is paying 6%.  An 
investor that comes onto the scene will obviously prefer the 6% bond.  Thus, your 5% bond 
becomes worth less, if sold on the open market, to account for this fact.  However, the interest 
rate movements will not affect the value of your principal if you hold the bond to maturity.  If 
you do not sell your bond on the open market, then you are entitled to the principal and fixed 
interest rate from the borrower.  See generally Vanguard: What the Past Teaches about Rising 
Rates and Bond Prices (June 9, 2004), 
https://flagship5.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/VanguardViewsArticle?ArticleJSP=/freshness/New
s_and_Views/news_ALL_risingrates_06092004_ALL.jsp. 
3 See Erlich v. First National Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 236 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1984) (stating that the generally accepted industry practice incorporates the principle of 
diversification into investment recommendations). 
4 See MSN Money (2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P124475.asp (last visited April, 
23, 2006) (implying that walking into a brokerage firm unannounced will often cause you to 
meet with the inexperienced broker of the day); see also Certified Financial Planner Board of 
Standards, Inc. 5 (2006), http://www.cfp.net/Upload/Publications/187.pdf (noting that 
“stockbroker” and “registered representative” are synonymous and distinguishing these titles 
from that of “investment adviser”). 
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annual income, and liquid net worth.5 He suggests that in his experience, it would 
be valuable to discuss these topics in some depth rather than just have you check 
off the boxes.6 For instance, he notes that checking off “good” for investment 
experience does not tell him whether you have ever invested in bonds.  You hope 
that the broker will know how to improve your financial situation, so you answer 
the broker’s questions in blind faith. 
This type of common exchange between stockbroker and client often leads 
to the broker providing the client with specific investment recommendations.7
Unfortunately, those recommendations may fail to satisfactorily address the needs 
of the client, and thus subject the broker to a suitability claim under National 
 
5 See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role 
for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 189, 274 (1998) (suggesting brokerage firms utilize an investment questionnaire in part 
because it provides proof of a basis for the broker’s recommendations).              
6 See NASD Obligations to Your Customer (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Registration 
& Qualifications” hyperlink; then follow “Broker Guidance & Responsibility” hyperlink; then 
follow “Registered Representatives” hyperlink; then follow “Obligations To Your Customers” 
hyperlink) (last visited April, 23, 2006) (stating that a broker’s initial responsibilities consist of 
gaining a clear picture of his client’s financial situation and investment objectives). 
7 A broker may also find it appropriate to refer the client to other experts, such as an estate 
attorney, for more specialized financial needs.  An estate attorney will often utilize a living trust 
to help minimize a client’s estate taxes, avoid probate, and provide for a client’s unique estate 
needs.  See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 3-4 (implying 
that ethical financial professionals refer clients to estate attorneys when appropriate to perform 
services such as wills, trusts and powers of attorney).  Some brokerage firms offer a designated 
beneficiary account that can serve to avoid probate, but it will not solve a client’s complex estate 
planning needs.  See schwab.com: Designated Beneficiary Plan Application, 
http://www.schwab.com/cms/P-239303.0/des_ben_plan.pdf?cmsid=P-239303&refid=P-
1013592&refpid=P-999739 (last visited April, 23, 2006).  See generally Gary C. Randall, Estate 
Planning and Community Property, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 807 (1992).   The broker may also refer 
clients to accountants or insurance agents.  See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, 
Inc., supra note 4, at 3-4. 
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Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] Rule 2310.8 “Suitability” refers to a 
broker’s obligation to have reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial 
situation, for believing recommendations he makes to the client are appropriate.9
The suitability test does not hinge on whether the client requests or consents to the 
recommendations.10 Instead, the test centers around whether the stockbroker meets 
 
8 NASD Rule 2310 (2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html 
(follow “Conduct Rules” hyperlink; then follow “2300 Transactions with Customers” hyperlink; 
then follow “2310 Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)” hyperlink) (last visited April 
23, 2006).  This rule explains the requirements for the suitability of client recommendations: 
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any 
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the 
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, 
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial 
situation and needs.  
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a non-
institutional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments 
are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable 
efforts to obtain information concerning: 
(1) the customer's financial status;  
(2) the customer's tax status;  
(3) the customer's investment objectives; and  
(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such 
member or registered representative in making recommendations to the customer.  
(c) For purposes of this Rule, the term "non-institutional customer" shall 
mean a customer that does not qualify as an "institutional account" under Rule 
3110(c)(4).   
Id. 
9 Id.; see also NASD Investor Information: Common Investor Problems and How to Avoid 
Them (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information” hyperlink; then follow 
“Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Investors’ Best Practices” hyperlink) (last visited 
April 23, 2006) (noting suitability as one of the four most frequently reported claims). 
10 Nancy E. Reich, Proof of Unsuitable and Unauthorized Trading by Securities Brokers, 28
AM. JUR. POF. 3D 87 § 7 (2005).  
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his fiduciary duty to provide recommendations that are in the best interests of the 
client, even if those recommendations oppose the client’s wishes.11 
Suitability claims represent the most common claim among securities laws 
and perhaps the most difficult claim for arbitrators12 to get their arms around.13 In 
particular, the challenge for arbitrators and lawyers in accurately assessing 
suitability is to overlook the common misperception among investors that financial 
loss represents the best indicator of whether a broker made unsuitable 
recommendations.14 In making recommendations, the stockbroker actually has to 
balance two competing risks: the downside risk of losing capital and the “risk” of 
 
11 See John M. Reynolds, 50 S.E.C. Docket 504 (1991) (finding speculative investments were 
unsuitable in this case and noting that “a broker is charged with making recommendations in the 
best interests of his customer even when such recommendations contradict the customer’s 
wishes”).    
12 The majority of suitability cases today are heard in arbitration.  See Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts have a duty to enforce 
arbitration claims due to favored policy); see also NASD Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute 
Resolution Statistics (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” hyperlink; 
then follow “NASD Dispute Resolution” hyperlink; then follow “Statistics” hyperlink) (last 
visited April 23, 2006) (noting that there were 1,926 suitability cases in 2005).  Unfortunately, a 
written rationale is not required for arbitrator’s decisions causing there to be little evidence of 
arbitrators’ reasoning in suitability cases.  Lori J. Parker, Stockbroker Liability Litigation, 88
AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 40 (2005).    
13 See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999) (stating that the NASD revealed to its members in 1998 through an 
Avoidance and Prevention Advisory that suitability claims accounted for 95% of “filings under 
NASD members' errors and omissions insurance policies . . . [and that] . . . ‘they are the most 
common yet most ambiguous of all client accusations’” (quoting Zarb Urges Broker Dealers to 
'Be on Guard' About Suitability, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 810 (May 29, 1998))). 
14 See Implication of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 1466 PLI/CORP 209, 266 (2004) (describing how registered 
investment companies, ironically, may be unsuccessful despite producing positive returns, and 
successful despite producing negative returns because the returns need to be compared to the 
overall performance of the market). 
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not meeting the investor’s future goals such as retirement.  Growth investments 
add value by diminishing the second “risk,”15 but in the past only the first risk has 
typically been addressed in suitability claims.16 Because growth investments tend 
to increase the first risk, fully understanding how growth investments should factor 
in to the suitability test presents a major hurdle for the legal community.17 The 
effect of this lack of understanding is inevitably a reoccurring misapplication of 
liability and damages in suitability cases.  
 A broker’s liability cannot be understood without appreciating that truly 
suitable recommendations may consist of more aggressive investments than the 
client initially desires.18 An increased awareness in legal circles of the value of 
aggressive investments is necessary and should have two divergent effects on 
broker liability.  On one hand, a broker who recommends growth investments 
should find his potential liability has decreased because the legal profession no 
longer solely focuses on financial loss.19 On the other hand, a broker who invests 
 
15 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 460 (2004) 
(suggesting that maintaining a more conservative strategy diminishes an investor’s long-term 
rate of return).  
16 See Tracy A. Miner, Measuring Damages in Suitability and Churning Actions Under Rule 
10b-5, 25 B.C. L. REV. 839, 840 (1984) (suggesting the standard model for assessing damages 
under a 10b-5 claim compensated for actual losses sustained because of the fraud).    
17 See Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Total-Return Trust Statutes, SK069 ALI-ABA 223, 230 
(2005) (stating that despite some declines, equity investments “still offer the best long-term 
growth prospects”).  
18 See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.     
19 See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text.  See generally NASD Arbitration & 
Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (noting that of the 1,610 arbitration cases 
6
conservatively should discover his liability has potentially increased because his 
recommendations may not be in the client’s best interest.20 The value of both of 
these effects is that it causes brokers to have a substantially greater incentive to 
invest aggressively enough to help millions of Americans come closer to their goal 
of retirement.21 To coincide with this suggested new understanding of broker 
liability, the standard for assessing damages must also adjust.  Financial loss 
should not be the true test for damages.22 The test should focus on the deviation in 
performance between the unsuitable portfolio and a properly managed portfolio, 
regardless of whether the client’s account increased or decreased in value.  
Because growth investments tend to increase the risk of financial loss, the 
recommended change of removing loss from the damages equation would again 
increase brokers’ incentive to recommend growth investments and help clients 
retire. 
 Part I of this Comment explains the history of the suitability claim including 
the relevance of the shift from the federal courts to the arbitration tribunals.  Part II 
 
ultimately decided by arbitrators in 2005, clients won monetary damages or non-monetary relief 
43% of the time). 
20 See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.  See generally NASD Arbitration & 
Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12; supra text accompanying note 19.      
21 See Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Public 
Pension Investment Policy Conference: The SEC Today: An Accent on Individual Investors 
(Mar. 20, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/spch090.txt 
(noting the lack of savings by Americans and suggesting that the actual savings may be invested 
too conservatively).  
22 See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
7
describes the meaning of growth investments and argues they should have a more 
prominent role in the suitability test.  This section also suggests the universal goal 
of retirement frequently causes aggressive growth investments to be in clients’ best 
interest.  Part III argues the current definition of suitability is inadequate because it 
fails to provide arbitrators and securities lawyers with an understanding of how 
stockbrokers consider growth when making a recommendation.23 Part III then 
goes on to depict the best and worst practices for utilizing growth in investment 
recommendations.  Part IV demonstrates how the speed of arbitration and 
mediation increase the need to diminish the ambiguity of the suitability test.  Part 
V recommends a simple solution: expand the definition of the current rule and 
increase education for arbitrators.  This section suggests the solution will properly 
put growth investments and clients’ retirement needs at the forefront in arbitration.  
Part VI provides real life examples to further demonstrate the problem, apply the 
solution, and provide insight into concurrent claims that often complicate the basic 
suitability claim.  Finally, Part VII argues that damages are currently misdiagnosed 
because of a lack of focus on the role of growth investments.  Part VII suggests the 
proper method for assessing damages would ignore whether the client’s portfolio 
increased or decreased in value and focus solely on the portfolio’s deviation in 
performance from a suitable portfolio. 
 
23 NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 Traditionally, NASD Rule 2310 served as merely a starting point for 
suitability claims.  Case law made clear that it would take more than violating the 
NASD’s suitability requirements for a client to have a valid legal claim against a 
stockbroker.24 To have a valid legal claim, a client typically had to add a claim 
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25 Rule 10b-5 
compensated clients who had been defrauded through a broker’s untrue statement 
or omission of a material fact.26 Thus, clients not only had to prove their broker’s 
recommendations were unsuitable, but also that they had been defrauded by their 
broker.27 However, that changed in 1987 when the forum for suitability claims 
underwent a major shift from the federal court system to the arbitration tribunals.28 
As a result of this change, the additional Rule 10b-5 requirement has essentially 
disappeared.29 
24 Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004); see also Brown v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 
1031 (2d Cir. 1993). 
26 Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
27 Id. 
28 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts 
have a duty to enforce arbitration claims due to favored policy).     
29 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 12, at 1584-85 (arguing that the shift to hearing 
suitability cases in arbitration has brought on “a shift in the legal elements that must be proven to 
establish a suitability violation, from fraud under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
which requires scienter (or at a minimum recklessness) to a nebulous quasi-legal, quasi-ethical 
test for breaches of standards of duty and care under SRO rules [NASD Rule 2310] which does 
not require scienter or recklessness”); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1995) (noting that bringing claims that invoke the 
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Ironically, this easier standard for clients has been initiated by brokerage 
companies through mandatory arbitration clauses in brokerage account 
agreements.30 Undoubtedly, the brokerage companies are enticed by the minimal 
expense and time of an arbitration proceeding,31 but it comes with the price of 
facing an arbitration panel that enforce the NASD Rule 2310 suitability standard 
without any need for the client to prove fraud.32 
Arbitration has provided an efficient alternative to the federal courts and has 
sped up the process of resolving suitability claims.33 However, the advantages of 
arbitration come with consequences as well.  To maintain an expedient process, 
 
antifraud provisions may have become obsolete because in arbitration “just and equitable 
principles of trade can be the basis for recovery”). 
30 See Richard A. Levan, National Regulatory Services 2nd Annual Conference on Suitability 
For Traditional and Online Brokers: The Arbitration Litigation Landscape- Trends, 
http://www.rlevan.com/about/nrs/nrs-10_01.htm (Oct. 4-5, 2001) (stating that many people view 
arbitration under NASD rules as more client friendly than federal court).  Sometimes, brokerage 
firms do not require a client opening a cash account to sign an account agreement.  In these 
cases, the client will not have agreed to the mandatory arbitration provision within the 
agreement.  As a result, any ensuing suitability claim will end up in federal court: making the 
federal antifraud provisions still relevant.  However, this is the exception to the rule; most clients 
are required to sign the account agreement.  Thomas J. McCool, Securities Arbitration- Action 
Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards, GAO/GGD 00-115 ¶ 80 (June 15, 2000).  This 
Comment focuses on arbitration cases because they make up the majority of suitability cases 
today.  See id.; see also schwab.com: Investment Account Application 9, 
http://www.schwab.com/ (follow “Account Types” hyperlink; then follow “Schwab One 
Individual Account Download” hyperlink; then follow “Schwab One Account Application” 
hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (providing required arbitration disclosures in bold in 
section 15 of the account agreement). 
31 See NASD Arbitration & Mediation (2006), http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & 
Mediation” hyperlink; then follow “Start an Arbitration or Mediation” hyperlink; then follow 
“Comparison Guide to Electing Mediation or Arbitration” hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006)  
(stating that arbitration is faster and less expensive than litigation).  
32 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 12, at 1584-85; see also Reich, supra note 10 at § 3.
33 See NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
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discovery is limited,34 a written rationale for the decision is not required,35 and 
oftentimes little information about an expert’s credentials is disclosed.36 Because 
suitability claims regularly endure the shortcuts of arbitration, it is important to 
ensure that arbitrators have a clear understanding of the intricacies of the suitability 
claim.  In particular, the role of growth investments must be better understood 
because a stockbroker recommending growth investments increases his chance of 
subjecting himself to a suitability claim, and yet growth investments have the 
unique power to put millions of Americans in a better position to retire.   
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF GROWTH INVESTMENTS 
A.  Growth Hides in the Shadows of Risk in Arbitration 
 The term “growth” represents a specific investment objective listed as one of 
the choices on a typical brokerage questionnaire.37 A client checking the box for 
growth on the questionnaire signals to a stockbroker that the client desires to utilize 
equity (stock) investments in order to achieve higher returns, and further that the 
 
34 See C. Thomas Mason III, Challenging Experts in Securities Arbitration, 1196 PLI/CORP 725, 
743 (2000). 
35 Parker, supra note 12. 
36 See Mason, supra note 34.  
37 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended 
Securities: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 588 n.157 
(2005) (noting that Charles Schwab & Co., the largest discount brokerage company, lists capital 
preservation, income, growth, and speculation as the investment objective choices on the account 
application); see also George V. Cornell, III, Preparing Your Client for a Securities Arbitration 
Hearing, 999 PLI/CORP 251, 255 (1997) (listing growth as a type of an investment objective 
discussed with one’s broker); Rapp, supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
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client will accept the inevitable risk associated with such equity investments.38 
Because the client may not recognize that he needs to take on risk to achieve 
important long-term goals such as retirement,39 the prudent broker may need to 
direct the client along a more aggressive path than the client initially considered.40 
The problem is that lawyers41 and Self-Regulatory Organizations [SROs] 
such as the NASD42 fail to sufficiently support the prudent broker in this “push” to 
help clients achieve their long-term dreams.  In fact, the legal community 
emphasizes the reverse in assessing suitability and asks whether the broker took on 
too much capital risk, rather than whether the broker took too little risk to achieve 
 
38 See Nenno, supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
39 See Bernard Blum, Hearing on SEC Independence Rule Proposal: Outline of Testimony- 
Retirement and Pension Planning (Sept. 13, 2000), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71300/testimony/blum1.htm (noting that retirement 
planning complete with investment recommendations is one of the most widely offered services 
amongst financial planners). 
40 The “more aggressive path” refers to a path of growth investments.  Growth differs from 
speculation.  Speculation represents another one of the investment objectives typically listed on 
an investment questionnaire and is the box that a client should select if they intend to “gamble” 
in the market.  See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text; cf. Randall H. Borkus, A
Trust Fiduciary’s Duty to Implement Capital Preservation Strategies Using Financial Derivative 
Techniques, 36 REALPPTJ 127, 142 (2001) (describing how the fiduciary of a trust may breach 
his duty to future interested parties when utilizing a conservative investment strategy that 
maximizes current income, yet fails to achieve sufficient growth). 
41 See Securities Arbitration Commentator: Information for Investors, 
http://www.sacarbitration.com/framecomm.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (stating that due to 
the fact that securities arbitration requires highly specialized lawyers, there “are relatively few 
truly qualified advocates in this field”). 
42 See NASD: Dispute Resolution Offers Alternative to Courts 10 (2005), 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/nasdw_011944.pdf 
(noting that the NASD handles close to 90% of all securities arbitration cases involving clients of 
brokerage firms). 
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the client’s needs.43 Due to the lack of emphasis on risk-taking as a positive and 
worthy objective in the case of growth, the most important question gets lost in the 
shuffle: Did the broker have “reasonable grounds”44 to take on risk so that he could 
achieve growth for his client?45 
The undeserved focus on financial loss in assessing suitability makes the 
need for growth seem subservient to the need to manage risk.46 The public and the 
brokerage industry would be better served if arbitrators and lawyers fully 
understood that a prudent stockbroker must reflect on a client’s need for growth as 
well as a client’s desire to minimize risk in the portfolio.47 Lawyers advocating on 
behalf of a brokerage firm should be prepared to inform the arbitrators of the depth 
of these competing interests and persuade the arbitrators that the degree of risk 
taken was prudent.   
The majority of suitability cases focus on the client’s financial loss,48 yet 
sometimes a stockbroker’s recommendations may negatively affect the client’s 
 
43 See Howard R. Elisofon & David M. Elkins, Evaluation of Arbitration Cases, 899 PLI/CORP 
27, 37 (1995) (positioning the suitability of growth investments as a question of whether the 
client knew of their inherent risk, rather than asking whether growth investments were necessary 
to meet the client’s stated investment objectives). 
44 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (defining suitability as a broker’s obligation to have 
reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to a 
client).     
45 Cf. Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
46 Arbitrators generally rely upon the client’s actual financial loss to determine damages.  
Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34. 
47 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.      
CHI. L. REV. 611, 652 n.65 (1985) (implying that a suitable portfolio may experience volatility).  
48 Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.  
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potential for appreciation.49 Under these circumstances, the broker may not have 
had reasonable grounds for believing the investments were suitable if the client had 
a need for growth to meet his future goals.50 Lawyers representing clients should 
consider initiating more cases in these instances.  For this strategy to be effective, 
arbitrators must not only consider the devastating impact of financial loss but also 
the long-term effects of lost profits in assessing suitability.51 The definition of 
suitability should incorporate the notion that stockbrokers have an obligation to 
prevent a client’s portfolio from being too conservative as well as from being too 
aggressive.52 
B.  Hypothetical Brokerage Case 
 To provide a look into how these competing interests play out in reality, let 
us return to our hypothetical.  The investment discussion begins with you 
expressing uncertainty to the broker of how to invest a $50,000 bonus check that 
you just received.  You ask whether he has any suggestions.  He responds that it 
depends on the current mixture of your portfolio, your investment goals, and your 
 
49 See, e.g., Borkus, supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
50 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 44. 
51 See Miner, supra note 16, at 862 (arguing that policy mandates that loss of market 
appreciation be included in damages). 
52 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (requiring that a broker’s recommendations be reasonable 
with respect to the client’s financial needs but omitting any reference to the types of needs a 
broker must consider).    
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risk tolerance.53 You discuss the questions from the investment questionnaire.  
Over the course of the conversation, you reveal that you have $100,000 in balanced 
mutual funds at XYZ Brokerage Company.54 In addition, you suggest to the 
broker that you have fifteen years until retirement and your income should allow 
you to not touch your investments until retirement.  Finally, you state that your 
goal in investing is to make some money. 
 The broker decides he has enough information to make recommendations.  
He suggests all aggressive growth mutual funds for your bonus check and 
recommends you consolidate your XYZ account55 so he can also begin to move 
your balanced investments into aggressive growth mutual funds.56 You follow all 
of his advice, but five years later when you look at your statement for the first 
time, you realize that you have lost money.  You decide to meet with a lawyer and 
 
53 See NASD Prohibited Conduct, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Investor Information” 
hyperlink; then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then follow “Prohibited Conduct” 
hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (implicating that suitability depends on the client’s 
specific financial circumstances).  
54 See Amy R. Doberman, Investment Company Names: Rule 35D-1 and Truth in Labeling,
1250 PLI/CORP 771, 780-81 (2001) (describing the requirements to be labeled a balanced mutual 
fund).  
55 One of a broker’s highest sales priorities is to convince a client to consolidate his outside 
assets to the broker’s firm.  Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, former Senior Vice 
President, UBS, & former Branch Manager, Merrill Lynch (April 5, 2006).  The broker then 
hopes to earn money off of the consolidated investments.  The advantages to consolidation 
include fewer statements, less tax paperwork, and the potential for more premium services.  The 
disadvantages consist of no longer having access to the previous firm’s proprietary products, 
investment research, and customized advice.  Id. 
56 Compare Richard W. Nenno, Planning With Dynasty Trusts, SG041 ALI-ABA 1597, 1672 
(2001) (laying out a typical approach for aggressive growth with 95% equities and calling it 
“maximum appreciation”), with id. at 1674 (describing a common balanced investment approach 
with 50% bonds and 50% equities and describing it as “moderate growth”). 
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question whether you have a cause of action against the broker for unsuitable 
recommendations. 
 In our hypothetical, you clearly appear to have a winning argument that the 
investment recommendations were legally unsuitable.  The facts seem fairly 
straightforward that the broker was at fault for your financial loss.  First, a client 
with average investment experience and average investment knowledge trusted his 
broker to provide him with appropriate recommendations.  Next, the broker made 
recommendations that increased the risk of the portfolio.  Finally, the broker’s 
recommendations caused the client to lose money after five years.  However, the 
presumption that a broker has made unsuitable recommendations if he causes 
financial loss for a client is fundamentally flawed.57 
This hypothetical demonstrates the common considerations a stockbroker 
has to ponder in order to make suitable recommendations.  First, the client has 
some experience in mutual funds,58 but he has little understanding of how the 
 
57 See Implication of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
58 An investor with limited experience in mutual funds should at least learn the difference 
between no-load and load mutual funds.  Load mutual funds charge an additional commission on 
top of any standard charges that may be associated with no-load mutual funds.  See 
Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/no-loadfund.asp (last visited April 23, 
2006) (noting that studies fail to show that load mutual funds outperform their counterparts, 
which suggests that no-load mutual funds usually give you more for your money); see also J. 
Julie Jason, Mutual Fund Share Classes: Uses and Abuses, 1327 PLI/CORP 27 (2002) (providing 
an excellent explanation of the complexity of mutual fund fees and distinguishing Class A, Class 
B, and Class C mutual fund shares). 
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bonds in his balanced mutual funds serve to mitigate the overall risk.59 Second, 
despite the client’s limited knowledge on the impact of bonds, the client has a fair 
amount of time and income to sustain more risk in his portfolio.60 Third, the client 
may have tax considerations for the sale of his portfolio,61 but it may still be in his 
best interest to accept the tax consequences in order to generate more growth in his 
portfolio.62 Fourth, the client has stated an investment objective of retirement, and 
thus the broker’s recommendations will need to help the client achieve this goal.  
Finally, in this example, the broker will likely have a fiduciary responsibility to 
monitor the investments on an ongoing basis,63 and therefore the broker needs to 
continue to review the portfolio to ensure the initial recommendations have 
remained suitable. 
C.  The Supervisor’s Obligations for Ensuring Suitability 
 The supervisor of the brokerage firm also has legal responsibilities to review 
the broker’s recommendations for suitability.64 The supervisor is at the 
 
59 See Richard L. Sandow, Risk Analysis in Suitability Cases, 1440 PLI/CORP 679, 691 (2004) 
(noting that the interplay between different asset classes can mitigate the overall risk of the 
investor’s portfolio). 
60 See Now That The §404(c) Regulations Are Final, Who Cares?, 1 No. 11 ERISALR 15, 21 
(1992) (noting that stocks outperform other investments over time). 
61 See Internal Revenue Service, available at http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq10-3.html (last visited 
April 23, 2006) (describing how to calculate capital gains when selling a mutual fund). 
62 See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
63 See Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (stating that a fiduciary 
relationship involves a breach of trust or confidence, but its scope cannot easily be defined). 
64 See NASD Rule 3010(d)(1) (2006), available at 
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (follow “Conduct Rules” hyperlink; then 
follow “3010 Supervision” hyperlink) (noting that a written, internal record should be 
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disadvantage of not being privy to the conversations between the broker and client.  
Thus, the supervisor will look for recommendations that seem to fall within the 
acceptable range of investments given the categories checked by the client on the 
questionnaire.65 If the investments do not seem to fall within the acceptable range, 
then the supervisor will usually ask the broker for further information to explain 
the discrepancies between the recommended portfolio and generally acceptable 
advice given the client’s circumstances.66 In the above hypothetical, the client 
suggested he was looking for growth.  In many cases, a growth objective would be 
sufficient for a supervisor to consider the recommendations of aggressive growth 
mutual funds as suitable.67 It would not necessitate further inquiry by the 
 
maintained that documents the reasonable supervisory review of all transactions by the members’ 
registered representatives); see also New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] Conduct Rules, Rule 
405 (2006), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSE_Rules/ (follow “General Rules” 
hyperlink; then follow “Operation of Member Organizations” hyperlink) (defining supervisors’ 
obligation as “supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the 
organization”). 
65 The supervisor will also likely consider whether a general pattern exists amongst investment 
recommendations made by the broker and whether the particular broker requires closer scrutiny.  
See John H. Sturc & Jennifer J. Schulp, Enforcement Actions Regarding Variable Products, 884
PLI/COMM 353, 388 (2006) (describing a lack of supervision systems designed to assess patterns 
of the stockbrokers as a “weak practice” according to examiners). 
66 But see Securities Law Developments: Enforcement Developments Recent Failure to 
Supervise Cases, 1108 PLI/CORP 33, 41 (1999) (arguing that if the supervisor has reason to be 
suspicious, then he must investigate the matter extensively rather than solely rely on the broker’s 
explanation). 
67 See Sturc & Schulp, supra note 65, at 388 (noting that “sound practices” include requiring 
stockbrokers to document every recommendation with a “suitability checklist that evidenced the 
suitability determination”).  However, a supervisor may find other information that counteracts 
this conclusion such as notes by the broker that the client said he could not afford to lose more 
than 5% of his portfolio.  See id. at 391-92 (implying that if there are any red flags with respect 
to the transaction, then the supervisor should look for objective information beyond what he is 
told by the stockbroker). 
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supervisor because the recommendations fall within the acceptable range of the 
growth investment objective.68 
D.  Varying Examples of Growth 
 Growth symbolizes the client’s acceptance of potentially negative returns in 
order to achieve higher performance.69 Growth covers a wide array of portfolios. 
Consider two distinct portfolios that would both likely be considered growth 
portfolios: Portfolio A comprised solely of ten individual stocks and Portfolio B 
consisting of mutual funds with exposure to over 5,000 stocks and bonds.  The risk 
and diversification levels of these two portfolios differ substantially, but both 
portfolios have the potential to outpace investments offering a fixed return,70 such 
as Certificates of Deposit, Corporate & Municipal Bonds, and Treasuries.71 
68 The supervisor must also consider the suitability of the broker’s recommendation to sell the 
balanced mutual funds.  Sometimes, a client will be subject to a back-end load and/or redemption 
fee if a fund is sold earlier than a pre-determined period of time.  A prudent supervisor will 
assess whether the sale will cause the client to experience excessive fees.  Heidi Stam & Judith 
L. Gaines, Disclosure of Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, 1112 PLI/CORP 237, 245 (1999).  
69 See NASD Invest Wisely: The Investment Decision, available at http://www.nasd.com 
(follow “Investor Information” hyperlink; then follow “Investor Protection” hyperlink; then 
follow “Invest Wisely” hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006) (noting that mutual funds may 
lose value and higher expected return means higher risk). 
70 Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1519, 1521, 1540 (1997) (describing defined contribution plans as a form of pension plan 
in which employees are the beneficial owners and suggesting that most of the participants in 
these plans should seek to maximize growth given their long-term investment horizons, but 
noting that most plans fail to do so because they underweight equity and overweight fixed-
income securities and thus invest too conservatively). 
71 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a certificate of deposit as “a bank 
document showing the existence of a time deposit, usu. one that pays interest”); id. at 191 
(defining a corporate bond as “an interest-bearing instrument containing a corporation's promise 
to pay a fixed sum of money at some future time”); id. at 192 (defining a municipal bond as “a 
bond issued by a nonfederal government or governmental unit, such as a state bond to finance 
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Portfolio A and Portfolio B also have the potential to under-perform these fixed 
instruments,72 even producing negative returns.  Generally, negative returns 
operate as the catalyst to clients initiating suitability claims.73 
Despite the risks involved in stocks, stockbrokers and their supervisors 
generally have an understanding that growth may be the most suitable portfolio 
strategy for clients.74 In fact, a client’s best interest necessitates a broker 
sometimes recommend growth investments to a client who initially chooses a more 
conservative investment objective.75 Clients often have a substantial need for 
growth in their portfolios to satisfy future needs76 even if they do not desire the risk 
associated with stock investments.77 For instance, even the most dedicated worker 
 
local improvements”); id. at 1539-40 (defining both a treasury note and a treasury bond as a 
“debt security issued by the federal government . . . considered risk-free, but . . . [that usually 
pays] relatively little interest”). 
72 See Gordon, supra note 70, at 1541 (describing how equity investments may under-perform 
fixed income investments over a certain period of time).  
73 Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46. 
74 See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Search For Solutions, U.S.F. L. REV. 695, 
704-05 (1992) (noting that institutional investors had migrated portions of their portfolios into 
diversified stock investments, due to research showing that these investments have outperformed 
fixed income instruments over time).  
75 See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.     
76 Retirement is not the only future need that clients should plan for years in advance.  See, e.g.,
J. Timothy Philipps & Ed R. Haden, It’s Not Love, But It’s Not Bad: A Response to Critics of 
Prepaid College Tuition Plans, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 304 (1992) (pointing out the ongoing 
challenge for parents striving to afford their child’s education because “[c]ollege costs have 
historically risen at a rate about two percent greater than the general inflation rate”). 
77 Therefore, even in the case of a risk-averse investor, the prudent stockbroker has to consider 
that the client’s best interest may be to invest for aggressive growth.  See Reynolds, supra note 
11 and accompanying text. 
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plans to retire when his health deteriorates.78 Retirement planning stands out 
amongst future needs because of its universal nature.  Unfortunately, statistics 
show that Americans as a whole are only saving one third to one half of what they 
will need for retirement.79 The lack of adequate savings is a rampant problem in 
the United States.80 The general rule is that you will spend approximately 70% of 
your pre-retirement income per retirement year.81 Clients seeking to sufficiently 
fund their retirement stand a much better chance of meeting their goal through 
growth investments than through more conservative strategies.82 Thus, insufficient 
retirement funding magnifies the need for brokers to adequately incorporate 
growth into investment recommendations.   
E.  The Potential Retiree  
 
78 See CAO Institute, http://www.socialsecurity.org/quickfacts/ (last visited April 23, 2006) 
(stating that “[b]y 2030, there will be 70 million Americans of retirement age—twice as many as 
today”). 
79 Levitt, supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
80 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2004) (stating 
“[i]mperfect self-control . . . plagues consumption and savings decisions, accounting for the 
rampant problem of insufficient saving for retirement”); see also David Wallechinsky, Is the 
American Dream Still Possible?, PARADE, April 23, 2006, at 4, 4 (pointing out how “the savings 
rate for Americans is the lowest it has been in 73 years”); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial 
Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income 
Workers, 65 MO. L. REV. 341, 403 n.49 (2000) (noting that “according to a 1993 telephone 
survey by Merrill Lynch Consulting only 30% of women between the ages of 25 and 65 were 
saving for retirement compared with 47% of men of the same ages”). 
81 Fidelity.com: How Much You May Need at Retirement, 
http://www.mysavingsatwork.com/atwork/1081430099016/1084856446098/1107928850703/110
8015368833.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (suggesting that financial experts estimate you may 
expect to spend an annual sum of between 60-80% of your pre-retirement income). 
82 See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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 In our hypothetical, the client alluded to his plan to retire in fifteen years.  
Although the client mentioned his plan to retire in passing, it is unlikely that he is 
focused on his retirement planning fifteen years in advance.83 Clients do not 
generally connect their current investment plan with such future goals and long-
term needs; rather, they tend to over emphasize short-term performance.84 In light 
of this fact, the broker needs to elicit the future needs of the client through 
effective questioning.  Although the typical stockbroker should not be expected to 
provide a comprehensive financial plan,85 he should consider the client’s potential 
to retire with adequate financial resources before determining the client’s 
appropriate risk/reward level and making recommendations.   
 
83 See Harvey Pitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Written Testimony 
Concerning Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102tshlp.htm 
(suggesting that in recent years clients have tended to ignore the long-term prospects of 
investments, and instead expected short-term results).  
84 Id. 
85 See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 2-3 (describing how 
a financial “planner can look at all of your needs including budgeting and savings, taxes, 
investments, insurance and retirement planning” . . . and stating that “[t]his big picture approach 
to your financial goals may set the planner apart from other financial advisers”; see also U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission: Financial Planners (July 29, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/finplan.htm (noting that with respect to financial planners, the 
services offered, education background of the planner, and compensation structure may all vary 
widely); Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA – 770, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 1 (Aug. 13, 
1981) (discussing when financial planners are subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).  
A financial plan usually represents an a la carte product that can be purchased separately.  A 
stockbroker may utilize a financial plan to present a client with a comprehensive view of their 
financial picture.  Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4 (p. 3).  The 
broker may be qualified to deliver the financial plan himself, or he may refer the client to one of 
his colleagues that specializes in financial plans.  Id. This in-depth product can complement 
investment management, but it is neither a substitute for ongoing advice nor a mandatory 
component of quality investment advisory services.  See id. 
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 Unfortunately, the typical broker does not have the expertise to weigh all the 
factors that go into retirement planning before he makes a recommendation.86 For 
instance, whether the client has paid off his mortgage would be a detail best left to 
a financial planner.87 On the other hand, the stockbroker may learn some basic 
information from the investment questionnaire and the client interaction to help 
him at least take the client’s retirement goals into account.  The acquired 
information should help provide the broker with a general sense of whether the 
client is on the path to adequately retire.  In turn, the broker can approximate the 
level of growth that will be necessary in the portfolio, and he can use that 
information to generate appropriate recommendations.   
 In our hypothetical, the broker learned that you have $100,000 in balanced 
mutual funds and $50,000 in cash. The broker was also told that you expect to 
retire in fifteen years.  Still, the broker needs to ask a few more questions before he 
can take your retirement needs into account.  Suppose that in response to the 
broker’s further inquiries, you reveal that you currently make $100,000 a year, you 
 
86 See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., supra note 4, at 2-3, 5; see also 
supra text accompanying note 85.  See generally Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Financial Literacy and Role of the Media (April 26, 1999), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch269.htm (noting that “[S]ixty-five 
million American households will probably fail to realize one or more of their major life goals 
because they have not developed a basic financial plan”) (emphasis added). 
87 See Jennifer Bayot, As Bills Mount, Debt on Homes Rise for Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com (follow “Archives” hyperlink; then search 
under “Headline” for “As Bills Mount”) (noting that Americans reaching the retirement age are 
now less likely to own their homes outright). 
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live off your entire income, you do not plan on having any future savings, and you 
do not have any liquid assets88 other than the $150,000 already mentioned and 
some emergency funds in a bank.  The broker can now piece together that you only 
have $150,000 to fund your retirement in fifteen years and that you rely on a 
lifestyle that requires $100,000 a year in income.   
 The prudent stockbroker will likely consider your retirement needs in 
relation to your expressed investment goals.  You stated that your investment 
objective was to make some money, and thus it may seem to the untrained 
professional that your goals are in line with sufficiently funding retirement.  
However, as the typical client, you meant that you want to make some money as 
long as it does not entail much risk.89 You feel that you are in a comfortable 
position because you pay off your credit cards, you make a decent living, you are 
pleased that you have been able to save $150,000, and fifteen years strikes you as 
being far off in the distant future.   
 
88 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
397, 423 (1987) (explaining that liquid assets consist of those assets that can be rapidly 
transferable into cash and thus have an easily determinable value). 
89 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) (describing human nature as risk averse when choosing 
between potential gains).  Unfortunately, a client’s natural aversion towards risk provides 
stockbrokers with an incentive to be biased towards conservative investments in hopes of 
keeping their clients satisfied.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor 
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 799 (2002) (describing how risk aversion 
psychologically relates to regret, a feeling universally found among investors with suitability 
claims).  This potential bias increases the need for there to be a “push” from the legal community 
to help clients retire.  
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 The prudent stockbroker sees a different picture.  He envisions that you 
would prefer to be able to invest more conservatively in retirement.90 Like most of 
his other clients, he imagines that you would prefer to invest in fixed income 
instruments during retirement that provide you with a recurring “paycheck.”91 To 
reach your retirement goal, you will need to make approximately 70% of your 
income, or $70,000 a year.92 Your broker believes that you may need $1.5 
million93 upon retirement to make $70,000 a year in fixed income if today’s 
historically low interest rates94 do not significantly rise before your retirement.  He 
recognizes that this goal is nearly impossible.  He also reasonably believes that you 
 
90 See Steven H. Sholk, ERISA and Federal Income Tax Aspects of Participant Directed 
Investments in Defined Contribution Plans, 625 PLI/TAX 459, 626 (2004) (stating that clients 
often shift their primary investment objective from growth to capital preservation as they near 
retirement). 
91 A common fixed income strategy is to ladder a bond portfolio such that each individual bond 
matures in a different year.  Ronald Harris, II, Investing in Municipal Bonds, 8-AUG. NBA 
NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 9, 32 (1994).  Under this approach, the broker will often purchase bonds 
that pay out interest in different months in order to provide you with recurring income.  The 
principle reason brokers recommend this strategy is in order to reduce interest rate risk.  See id. 
Primarily, your broker wants to avoid the possibility of your entire portfolio maturing during a 
period of lower interest rates and thus causing you to have a low return on your investment when 
you reinvest.  Id.   
92 See Fidelity.com: How Much You May Need at Retirement, supra note 81 (suggesting that 
financial experts estimate you may expect to spend an annual sum of between 60-80% of your 
pre-retirement income). 
93 See Kimberly Lankford, Kiplinger.com: $1 Million Nest Egg May Not Be Enough (July 30, 
2004), available at http://www.kiplinger.com/personalfinance/about/archive/ (search under 
“Search the Archive” for “$1 million nest egg”; then follow the “Kiplinger.com -/ Saving - $1 
Million Nest Egg May Not Be Enough – July 30, 2004” hyperlink). 
94 See Director of Fixed Income: Schwab Center for Investment Research, Don’t Fall Short on 
Bonds (August 12, 2005), 
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/market_insight/investing_strategies/bonds/dont_fall_sho
rt_on_bonds.html?cmsid=P-895998&lvl1=market_insight&lvl2=investing_strategies&refid=P-
867031&refpid=P-463189 (demonstrating how despite recent rate hikes by the Federal Reserve, 
long-term Treasury yields have actually flattened out providing investors with barely over a 4% 
annual return for Treasury investments of maturities greater than ten years). 
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will likely have an even greater shortfall if you invest in balanced mutual funds 
rather than aggressive growth mutual funds. 
F.  More Challenges for the Potential Retiree 
 In addition, the prudent stockbroker recognizes more general concerns that 
increase the need for your portfolio to include growth investments.  The failure of 
Social Security,95 inflation, the population’s increasing life expectancy,96 and 
humans’ general aversion towards risk97 all fuel the need for the broker to make it 
a priority to help you reach your retirement goals. 
 The first general concern is whether funds from Social Security will be 
available for anyone in retirement other than today’s seniors.98 Social Security 
continues to provide clients with little assurance that it will help with clients’ 
retirement.  The plan is expected to have negative resources as early as 2017.99 
President Bush seeks to provide Social Security participants with the choice to 
 
95 See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social 
Security Privatization, 41 B. C. L. REV. 975, 1056 (2000) (noting that private long-term equity 
investments reflect a more sensible retirement strategy than relying on the poor performing and 
precarious system ironically named Social Security). 
96 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 945 (8th ed. 2004) (defining life expectancy as “the period 
that a person of a given age and sex is expected to live, according to actuarial tables”). 
97 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
98 See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960) (holding that there is no absolute legal 
right to Social Security benefits). 
99 President George Bush, President Participates in Social Security Conversation in Maryland 
(June 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050623.html. 
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invest in growth in order to make up for the plan’s shortfall,100 but thus far Bush’s 
strategy has failed to gain sufficient support.101 Unfortunately, no other 
privatization plan for maximizing the return on Social Security funds through 
investing for growth has been proposed by the legislature.102 As a result of the 
expected shortfall and the lack of a widely accepted solution, investors should not 
rely on Social Security to fund their retirement. 
 The second widespread effect on clients’ retirement funds is inflation.  The 
annual rate of inflation from 1913 to 2005 was 3.39%.103 Inflation increases the 
amount of money that a client needs to have for retirement.  For instance, in order 
to reach your goal of retirement in fifteen years, if you will need $1.4 million in 
today’s dollars to do so adequately, then inflation will likely cause your true need 
 
100 See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four “Truths” of Personal Social Security Accounts: 
Evidence From the World of 401k Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV. 901, 912-13, n.39 (2003) (showing the 
President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security recommends several stock mutual funds).   
101 Brooke Oberwetter, Democrats Block Senate Vote on Personal Accounts 1 (Nov. 18, 2005), 
available at http://www.socialsecurity.org/sstw/sstw11-18-05.pdf; see also Greg Anrig, Jr. & 
Bernard Wasow, The Social Security Network: Twelve Reasons Why Privatizing Social Security 
Is a Bad Idea (December 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/RetirementSecurity/12badideas.pdf; John Kerry, 
http://kerry.senate.gov/v3/issue/seniors.html (last visited April 23, 2006) (opposing President 
Bush’s plan because he argues it will create up to $2.2 trillion in debt).  But see Cato Institute, 
http://www.socialsecurity.org/quickfacts/ (last visited April 23, 2006) (stating that the current 
rate of return on Social Security Taxes is less than 2% for the average worker). 
102 Bobby Lewis Dexter, Tax Terrorism: Nasty Truths about Investor Control Theory and the 
Accommodation of Social Security Privatization, 57 MERCER L. REV. 553, 579 (2006).  
103 InflationData.com (2006), 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/AnnualInflation.asp (last visited April, 23, 2006).  
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to be over $2.30 million.104 Another way to look at it is that the actual return you 
will receive on your investments is lower than the published returns.  For instance, 
the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security estimated a 6.5% annual 
return for stocks after inflation.105 In contrast, the reported average return of the 
S&P 500 Index,106 a common measure for stock investments, stands between 10 
and 12%.107 In addition, the Commission estimated just over a 3% annual return 
for bonds after subtracting inflation.108 
Although both growth and fixed income instruments produce a lower actual 
return when considering inflation, if a client receives a mere 3% actual return in 
bonds, then it should become clearer why the client often needs to invest in growth 
to meet his retirement goals.  For instance, let us assume that you expect to retire 
after 25 years and you plan to invest your $150,000 in bonds both before and 
 
104 The figure of $2.30 million is calculated based on the historic inflation rate of 3.39% 
remaining constant over the fifteen year period.  However, in reality, inflation will vary and the 
deviations will alter this figure. 
105 Medill, supra note 100, at 930. 
106 The S&P 500 Index cannot be perfectly duplicated through an investment.  Iman Anabtawi, 
Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 598 n.82 (2006).  
However, there are two ways to mirror the index’s returns: a mutual fund or an Exchange-Traded 
Fund [ETF].  ETFs trade on the exchange like a stock, and yet they still offer the inherent 
diversification found in a mutual fund.  An investor should consider ETFs over mutual funds 
when they have a lump sum to invest because the annual operating expense of ETFs tends to be 
substantially lower.  Conversely, an investor repeatedly buying into the market will usually find 
the cost of commissions on ETFs to be more expensive than buying mutual funds that do not 
have a transaction fee.  See generally Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The Unsupportability of 
Index Providers’ Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of Exchange Traded Funds,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1126-31 (2004). 
107 Thomas Pavlick, Analyzing the Effects of Transaction Cost, Leverage and Sector 
Concentration on Portfolio Performance, Portfolio Risk, and Client Suitability, 1327 PLI/CORP 
9, 15 (2002). 
108 Medill, supra note 100, at 930-31.  
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during retirement.  A 3% annual return on $150,000 would provide you with just 
over $314,000 in 25 years.109 For this plan to be a sound strategy, $314,000 needs 
to generate a sufficient income for you in retirement.  Unfortunately, a 3% return 
on $314,000 would give you only approximately $9,400 a year in income, and thus 
this strategy would fall drastically short of providing you with the $70,000 annual 
income you will likely need in retirement.  This significant shortfall suggests that 
you will need to save additional funds if you are to completely satisfy your 
retirement goal.  However, even without additional savings, you would have at 
least been closer to meeting your goal had you invested in riskier investments such 
as equities, given their historic annual rate of return of 6.5%.   
 Third, people’s life expectancy has dramatically increased to the point that 
the general population may be expected to live to over 100 years old in the near 
future.110 Assuming clients do not plan to increase their retirement age, an increase 
in life expectancy implies that clients must be prepared to fund their living 
expenses for a much greater period of time.  The figures represent a large 
percentage increase, possibly doubling the number of years clients will have in 
 
109 The figure of $314,000 is calculated based on the historic bond rate of 3% remaining 
constant over the fifteen year period.  However, in reality, returns will vary and the deviations 
will alter this figure. 
110 See Dilley, supra note 95, at 1054-1055 (stating that “[p]redictions of genetic breakthroughs 
that promise regular and healthy lifespans of over 100 in the near future mean increased 
uncertainty about the length of time retirement income will be needed”); see also Kimberly 
Lankford, Kiplinger.com: Overestimate Your Life Expectancy (Aug. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.kiplinger.com/personalfinance/columns/ask/archive/2004/q0811.htm (suggesting that 
many financial planners estimate a life-span of over 100 years). 
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retirement.111 This life-span increase diminishes the chance clients will be able to 
live off of their principal rather than live off of their return on investment.  Thus, 
the client must have sufficient funds come retirement to generate an adequate 
return.  Growth investments will often be necessary to achieve sufficient funds 
come retirement.    
 Finally, social studies have found human nature to be generally risk averse 
when choosing between potential gains.112 These studies imply that a client left to 
his own devices will tend to steer clear of investments that entail more risk.  
Growth investments necessarily include an element of risk because they do not 
have a fixed rate of return,113 and yet growth investments are essential in many 
cases for a client to meet his retirement goals.  Thus, the stockbroker plays an 
important role in keeping a client on track towards meeting his retirement goal, and 
the suitability test must recognize this role.   
III.  SUITABILITY 
A. NASD Conduct Rule 2310 Drives the Law 
 Because a prudent stockbroker must strongly consider whether growth 
investments would help fulfill a client’s retirement needs, it seems only natural that 
 
111 Assume a client was planning on retiring at 65, and he was previously expected to live until 
age 80 (15 years).  If he was now supposed to live until 100 (20 more years), then there would be 
over a 100% increase in his number of retirement years.   
112 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89; cf. Moore, supra note 80, at 357-59 (finding that 
certain groups such as lower-income workers, women, and blacks may tend to be more risk-
averse with their investments than the general population).  
113 See NASD Invest Wisely: The Investment Decision, supra note 69. 
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the suitability test should apply the same principle.114 Therefore, the test should at 
least note that a broker must weigh a client’s need for future retirement funds 
against the competing interest of managing risk.  Unfortunately for members of the 
legal community untrained in investment advice, NASD Rule 2310 falls short of 
providing such extensive guidance.115 Nevertheless, NASD Rule 2310 serves as a 
bridge between the investment community and the legal community for assessing 
the suitability of investment recommendations.  It provides the common law with a 
general definition of what it means for a stockbroker to have made a suitable 
recommendation.  The rule requires the broker to make reasonable efforts to learn 
about certain crucial facts concerning the client’s financial situation before making 
any recommendation.116 In addition, the rule demands stockbrokers “have 
reasonable grounds for believing the recommendation is suitable for such customer 
upon the basis of the [financial] facts, if any, disclosed by such customer . . . .” 117 
The NASD test for suitability utilizes the typical legal standard of 
reasonableness.118 For those professionals well-versed in the investment industry, 
 
114 “Having enough money for retirement is a major problem for today’s investors.  If the legal 
system could help by promoting growth for individual investors, then that would be a giant leap 
forward.”  Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, supra note 55.    
115 NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 44. 
116 NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.  
117 Id. 
118 Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (noting that for the court to find 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the plaintiff must overcome “a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and “show 
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this serves as an acceptable test.  However, the standard provides little guidance, if 
any, on the competing considerations a broker must weigh when making a 
recommendation.119 For example, the suitability test leaves out any mention of the 
obligation of stockbrokers to balance the inherent risk found in growth 
investments, versus the risk that clients, without sufficient growth investments, will 
have a shortfall when it comes time to meet their retirement goals.  Therefore, the 
test leaves the legal community out in the cold when trying to determine how a 
prudent stockbroker analyzes a client’s financial circumstances.  If arbitrators were 
provided with more guidance under NASD Rule 2310 to help them understand the 
analysis that the prudent broker carries out prior to making a recommendation, then 
they would be more likely to adequately determine whether in fact this broker had 
“reasonable grounds” for believing the investment was suitable.120 
Unfortunately, in legal practice and in scholarly articles, the application of 
the suitability rule has focused too much on the desire to limit risk and too little on 
 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different”) (emphasis added).  
119 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (requiring that a broker’s recommendations be 
reasonable with respect to the client’s financial needs but omitting any reference to the types of 
needs a broker must consider).     
120 See Stuart D. Root, Suitability  – The Sophisticated Investor  – And Modern Portfolio 
Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 292-93, 295-96 (1991) (noting that a 1963 
Special Study found that the NASD “should provide further definition of content” with respect to 
suitability but that the request was “largely ignored by the NASD”). 
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the need for growth.121 Given that human nature tends to be risk averse,122 it 
should probably come as no surprise that the legal community continues to imply 
losses are the only real tragedy that comes from unsuitable investment 
recommendations.123 To the contrary, it is equally tragic when individuals cannot 
have leisure time to enjoy the fruits of their years of hard work because their 
investments did not achieve enough growth to adequately retire.  Imagine a forty-
year veteran of the workforce asks his stockbroker at age 65 whether he has 
sufficient funds to retire.  The broker sadly informs the client that he had been 
investing conservatively, and due to this rate of return, the client will have to work 
another fifteen years before he can retire.  This risk rings true for many potential 
retirees, and yet it can be minimized through the broker recommending more 
suitable investments along the way.  
B.  Modern Portfolio Theory Drives Investment Strategy 
The minimal guidance provided by NASD Rule 2310 leaves ambiguous the 
question of whether a specific recommendation is unsuitable.124 Because the legal 
standard is ambiguous, the legal profession relies on industry experts to provide 
 
121 See Pavlick, supra note 107; see also Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; supra text 
accompanying note 46. 
122 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
123 Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46. 
124 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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clarification of what is suitable.125 Modern Portfolio Theory provides the 
predominant industry view that every investment should be considered in relation 
to the whole.126 In addition, the theory relies upon asset allocation127 to imply that 
a broker should recommend diversification in the overall portfolio to minimize the 
client’s risk.128 Arbitrators can appreciate the need for diversification more easily 
than the need for growth investments because diversification seeks to minimize the 
risk of capital loss and capital loss has been the main focus of damages in the 
past.129 However, diversified investments can still be allocated aggressively or 
conservatively, so whether investments are diversified does not conclude the 
analysis.  Unfortunately, in the end, arbitrators favor brokers that error towards a 
conservative asset allocation, even when more aggressive investments are in the 
 
125 Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to 
Measure Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1617 (1999).  
126 Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 747, 798 (2001) 
(noting the wide acceptance of Modern Portfolio Theory).   
127 See Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 777, 796 (2000) (defining asset allocation as the distribution of money between the 
major asset classes: stocks, bonds, and cash).  
128 See Bradley P. Rothman, 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REV.
921, 934 (2002) (implying that Modern Portfolio Theory is used to implement a diversified 
strategy and minimize risk).  Thus, even when investing for growth, the broker should still seek 
to minimize the inherent risk within growth investments through diversification.  Unfortunately, 
diversification is barely hinted to in the current NASD rule.  NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8.  
NASD Rule 2310 should highlight growth investments because they are at odds with the risk of 
capital loss.  In doing so, the rule should note for clarification purposes that the need for growth 
should not cause a broker to ignore the principle of diversification.  See infra Part V. 
129 Michael E. Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 655, 662 (2005); Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying 
note 46.    
34
client’s best interest.130 Furthermore, arbitrators currently have little reason to 
focus on how aggressive investments help clients retire because a broker’s failure 
to recommend these growth investments does not currently subject the broker to a 
suitability claim.131 
One way to consider Modern Portfolio Theory is that if you combine 
aggressive investments with conservative investments, then you will often end up 
with a moderate portfolio.  Adding even some growth investments to a portfolio 
will increase the client’s chances of meeting his future goals such as retirement.132 
This example demonstrates that under Modern Portfolio Theory, recommending 
aggressive growth investments may be entirely appropriate for a moderate 
investor.133 
Based on Modern Portfolio Theory, the suitability of growth investments 
depends on the investments’ role within the overall portfolio.  Therefore, the 
recommendation to purchase just three technology growth stocks for a client may 
seem unsuitable on the surface because the broker’s suggestion seems to fail to 
 
130 See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Robert E. Scott & George G. 
Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1428, 1491 n.126 (2004) (noting that investors “can choose their desired portfolio risk 
by altering their asset allocation between risky and risk-free assets”).   
131 See Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
132 See Zelinsky, supra note 15 and accompanying text.   
133 See Rapp, supra note 5, at 192-93 (suggesting that under Modern Portfolio Theory a risky, 
growth investment may not only be deemed suitable for a portfolio with investment objectives of 
safety and income, but may in fact be a wise recommendation). 
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utilize asset allocation.134 However, if the technology stocks increase the client’s 
exposure in the technology sector to a level that makes the client’s overall portfolio 
consistent with technology exposure in the S&P 500,135 then the recommendations 
may be a very appropriate fit.136 This is true even if the client’s overall portfolio 
does not reside with the broker making the recommendations.137 In other words, if 
the broker only manages the three technology stocks for the client, but he is also 
aware of how these investments balance out the investments at ABC Brokerage 
Company, then the recommendations may be legally suitable.138 
For a broker to implement Modern Portfolio Theory, he needs to know about 
the client’s entire portfolio.139 Inquiring about a client’s other investments is 
mandatory because NASD Rule 2310 requires the broker to make reasonable 
 
134 See Hu, supra note 127, at 796 (defining asset allocation as the distribution of money 
between the major asset classes: stocks, bonds, and cash, and noting that asset allocation 
accounts for approximately 80-90% of a portfolio’s actual performance).   
135 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 803-04 (2002) 
(implying the S&P 500 represents a broad stock market index covering numerous sectors).   
136 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in 
Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 525 (2003) (suggesting that recommending technology 
stocks may be suitable for an investor with an objective of long-term growth, but that the 
recommended exposure likely needs to be for a reasonable portion of the portfolio). 
137 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (stating that the broker should consider other security 
holdings revealed to him, and omitting any requirement that those investments be directly held 
by that broker).  Because NASD Rule 2310 does not explicitly make the subtle point that the 
domicile of the investments is immaterial, the broker that recommends all aggressive 
investments can easily appear reckless in the eyes of the arbitrators.  Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Michael T. Johnson, Note, Speculating on the Efficacy of “Speculation”: An Analysis of 
the Prudent Person’s Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 419, 427 (1996) (noting that Modern Portfolio Theory necessarily analyzes investments in 
relation to the entire portfolio).   
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inquiries to learn of the client’s financial situation.140 Unfortunately, in some 
cases, the broker may not be able to acquire enough information about the client’s 
portfolio even after reasonable inquiry.141 
In our hypothetical, the client walked into the stockbroker’s place of 
business, presumably with goals in mind.  In this case, it was a natural progression 
for the client and stockbroker to work together to create an overall portfolio 
strategy.142 This makes the job easier for the broker to recommend suitable 
investments.  Yet, many stockbrokers have to generate new business through 
prospecting.143 The greatest challenge in applying Modern Portfolio Theory comes 
from the case of the new client obtained through solicitation by cold-call or 
 
140 NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8. 
141 In a new relationship with a broker, fear will often prevent a client from fully trusting the 
broker.  Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, supra note 55.  The client may fear that if he 
reveals his outside holdings to the broker, then the broker will pressure him into transferring all 
of his assets to the broker.  Id. This is probably a well-founded fear.  However, the client’s 
“secrets” prevent the broker from being able to fully understand the client’s diversification needs 
or the tax consequences of a purchase or sale.  Id. With respect to the latter, realized gains are 
offset by realized losses, even if they do not come from the same brokerage account.   
142 One of the common obstacles for a broker looking to implement an effective strategy is 
convincing an investor to diversify a concentrated stock position.  A concentrated position is 
usually considered to consist of 20% or more of your holdings in one individual stock position.  
Many investors have large stakes in their employer’s stock.  Sadly, many investors choose to 
ignore the fact that their employer’s stock offers the same type of risk that diversification is 
designed to avoid.  Id.    
143 See Rapp, supra note 5, at 217 (suggesting that at the typical brokerage house, stockbrokers 
are trained more in sales than in how to make suitable investment recommendations). 
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seminar.144 In this case, it is the broker that seeks out the client, rather than vice 
versa.  
C.  Sales Drive the Stockbroker 
When a broker proactively prospects, he may tend to focus on the sale, 
instead of the client’s actual needs.  As a result, a danger exists that a broker will 
recommend growth investments solely for the purpose of proving his worth to the 
client.  It is important to make clear that “the need for growth” does not make 
every growth recommendation suitable.  At a minimum, the recommendation 
needs to be tied to the client’s future goals.   
For instance, reasonable inquiries by a broker may uncover little information 
about the details of a client’s actual portfolio because the typical client will be 
reluctant to trust a solicitor.145 Still, the client may agree to test the broker out with 
a small portion of his portfolio to assess the broker’s ability to achieve good 
performance.146 In this case, the client only wants to see how well the broker 
knows the market, rather than be given customized recommendations.  
 
144 Investment seminars usually begin by the stockbroker advertising in a newspaper or through 
a mailer.  The advertisement will usually promote some investment topic thought to be of interest 
to wealthy prospects, such as estate planning.  Ultimately, the broker will attempt to turn the 
prospect into a client through setting up a one-on-one meeting.    
145 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 651 (suggesting that a client that has not been 
convinced of a broker’s abilities will more likely test the broker by monitoring the broker’s 
decisions).  See generally NYSE Conduct Rules, Rule 405, supra note 60 (stating the rule known 
in the industry as “Know Your Customer” because it requires a broker to use due diligence to 
obtain basic information about every client). 
146 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 651; see also supra text accompanying note 
145. 
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Nevertheless, neither the lack of client information available to the broker nor the 
client’s stated objective should change the stockbroker’s approach.147 It is usually 
considered unsuitable to recommend extremely risky investments for the entire 
portfolio even when it is the client’s desire.148 Thus, the broker still must apply 
asset allocation and Modern Portfolio Theory to the extent possible.149 This 
ensures that the advice is tailored to the client’s unique circumstances150 and that 
the client’s risk is kept to a minimum.151 
A standard sales pitch in the investment industry has been for a broker to ask 
a prospect to give the broker a chance based on one stock.152 In this case, the 
broker does not learn enough about the client’s outside assets in order to properly 
 
147 The broker’s approach still needs to consist of attempting to learn at least the client’s basic 
financial circumstances.  Arbitrators should not tolerate “loose cannon” brokers that recommend 
un-customized growth investments to win business.   
148 See Reynolds, supra note 11 and accompanying text.      
149 A broker who has very little information about the client’s outside assets has to treat the 
client’s portfolio as completely devoid of diversification.  The broker must assume that none of 
the client’s outside assets will balance out the broker’s recommended investments.  This 
conservative approach avoids any risk of the broker making false assumptions about the client’s 
diversification needs.  
150 Even though the broker is in the dark about the client’s outside assets, he still needs to learn 
some basic information about the client in order to utilize Modern Portfolio Theory and asset 
allocation.  The broker will have to uncover the basic information of the client’s true risk 
tolerance, overall investment objective, and time-frame.  This will guide the broker in 
determining between asset allocation models such as moderate and aggressive.  If the broker can 
not learn this information from the client, then he is not in a position to make any 
recommendations. 
151 See generally Johnson, supra note 139 (noting that Modern Portfolio Theory necessarily 
analyzes investments in relation to the client’s entire portfolio while seeking to reduce overall 
volatility).    
152 See Gedicks, supra note 37, at 555 (noting that the typical broker/client relationship starts 
with the broker utilizing salesmanship to sell a particular investment). 
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utilize Modern Portfolio Theory.153 He simply recommends one “hot” growth 
stock without regard to the rest of the portfolio.154 Seemingly, the need for growth 
in this one stock is tied to proving the broker’s worth as an expert, not the client’s 
future needs such as retirement.155 The broker has incentive to recommend a risky 
investment and hope that it will achieve high performance and impress the client.   
Even if the broker eventually plans to advise the client prudently, the idea 
that the broker needs to prove his ability to predict market performance may be 
doing the client a disservice.  It is highly unlikely that even a stockbroker has the 
capabilities to outthink the market, and thus he should not pretend to have a 
“crystal ball” ability in order to win business.156 The broker should provide the 
client with reasonable expectations about how he may help.  He should explain that 
his expertise derives from his ability to implement an investment strategy based on 
 
153 See Rapp, supra note 5, at 272-73 (arguing that Modern Portfolio Theory and real world 
practices such as cold-calling demand that the suitability test be understood to apply differently 
to stand-alone and portfolio recommendations). 
154 See William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?,
54 EMORY L.J. 843, 898 (2005) (implying that chasing hot stocks is an investment strategy 
reserved for amateurs). 
155 See Newman v. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that when an 
stockbroker talks about hot stocks or how his primary objective is to make money for the client, 
a reasonable investor should interpret that as nothing more than a sales pitch). 
156 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative 
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 987, 1037 n.9 (1992) (explaining that advocates of the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis [ECMH] believe the efficiency of the marketplace makes it nearly impossible for 
anyone to outperform the market, and noting that a sub-theory of ECMH, the Random Walk 
Theory, holds that future market movements are random). 
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the client’s financial circumstances.157 This is in fact what the suitability test calls 
for from the broker.158 
IV.  THE CHALLENGE IN ARBITRATION  & MEDIATION 
 Claims against brokerage firms are typically decided by arbitration159 
through the NASD.160 Arbitrators typically have as little as two to three days to 
hear the evidence on whether the broker made suitable recommendations.161 The 
speed of arbitration magnifies the risk that any lack of understanding on the part of 
arbitrators will lead to an incorrect decision.  Thus, an important question remains 
 
157 A stockbroker may hold more than the basic licenses or certifications necessary to 
recommend investments.  These designations are not required for a broker to do his job, but they 
do demonstrate that he has enhanced education in his field.  For instance, a broker may be a 
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) or a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA).  A CFP has expertise 
in reviewing areas typically found in a financial plan, such as estate planning, but this 
certification is unnecessary to deliver financial plans.  A CFA has expertise in analyzing 
individual stocks.  There are three levels of CFA, yet none of these levels are necessary for a 
broker looking to recommend the purchase or sale of a stock.  See Certified Financial Planner 
Board of Standards Inc., http://www.cfp.net/ (last visited April 23, 2006); see also CFA Institute, 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/ (last visited April 23, 2006).    
158 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8 (defining suitability as a broker’s obligation to have 
reasonable grounds, based on the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to a 
client) (emphasis added).     
159 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting courts 
have a duty to enforce arbitration claims due to favored policy).  See generally Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636-37 (2005) 
(describing the shift towards enforcing mandatory arbitration in the securities industry).    
160 See NASD: Dispute Resolution Offers Alternative to Courts, supra note 42; see also Rapp, 
supra note 5, at 191 (noting that suitability claims consistently rank amongst the top claims 
against brokerage firms). 
161 See SEC, NASD and Securities Law Information Center, http://www.sec-nasd-
regulations.com/process.htm (last visited April 23, 2006) (noting that the average arbitration case 
takes between six to twelve months from start to finish, and that most hearings only last between 
two to three days); see also Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d 
Cir. 1967) (noting that the basic purpose of arbitration is to quickly resolve cases and avoid 
extended litigation); NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31 (stating that arbitration is 
“faster, less expensive, and less formal than litigation”). 
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whether arbitrators have a clear understanding about the need for growth in clients’ 
portfolios.162 To evaluate this question, let us return to our hypothetical.    
Unfortunately, you put blind faith in your stockbroker five years ago, and his 
advice has caused your portfolio to decline in value over that stretch of time.  Now, 
five years later, you find yourself awaiting arbitration to bring a claim against your 
broker for recommending unsuitable investments.  While the date for your 
arbitration hearing is pending, your lawyer suggests that you utilize mediation to 
attempt to reach a fair settlement and circumvent the ensuing costs of arbitration.163 
In mediation, a neutral third party trained in negotiation will help both sides come 
to a mutual agreement.164 You realize that this means you need to rely on your 
lawyer to fully appreciate the value of your claim.  If your lawyer does not realize 
the strengths of your claim, then you may not reach a fair settlement.  If your 
 
162 See Securities Arbitration Center: Unsuitability, 
http://www.securitiesarbitration.us/stockbrokerdisputes.htm.html (last visited April 23, 2006) 
(stating that “[a]rbitrators often struggle with unsuitability claims”).  But cf. NASD Investor 
Education: When Should You Complain?, 
https://apps.nasd.com/Investor_Information/Complaints/complaintCenter.asp (last visited April 
23, 2006) (demonstrating that the NASD appreciates that even if a client lost money, that fact 
does not necessarily indicate that the stockbroker engaged in any misconduct at all).    
163 See NASD Mediation, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” hyperlink; 
then follow “Mediation” hyperlink; then follow “Mediation Myths & Realities” hyperlink) (last 
visited April 23, 2006) (noting that mediation may run concurrent with pending arbitration and 
most parties agree that mediation results in time savings and cost savings); see also NASD 
Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (showing that only 24% of 
arbitration cases were decided by arbitrators in 2005, while 54% were completed by settlement: 
either directly by the parties or via mediation).   
164 NASD Mediation, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” hyperlink; then 
follow “Mediation” hyperlink; then follow “Mediation: An Alternate Path” hyperlink) (last 
visited April 23, 2006).  
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lawyer does not realize any weaknesses in your claim, then the other side may balk 
at the offer and force you to pay additional arbitration costs.  In other words, if 
opposing counsel fully appreciates the need for growth in investments but your 
lawyer does not, then your decision to hire this lawyer could be a costly mistake. 
 You choose not to settle at mediation, so you and your attorney have to 
prepare for arbitration.  Your lawyer explains to you that arbitration still has 
advantages over litigation because it is faster and less expensive.165 To get ready 
for the arbitration hearing, your lawyer has helped you gather all documentation 
necessary to prove your case including your brokerage statements, a copy of the 
initial investment questionnaire you had completed, and any emails you received 
from your broker.166 Your lawyer informs you that besides documentation it will 
come down to a battle of experts.  The experts will opine on the suitability of the 
investment recommendations.167 
The expert plays an even more pivotal role in arbitration cases than in 
litigation because of the limited time involved for just a few arbitrators to come to 
 
165 See NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31. 
166 See BrokerBuster.com, http://www.brokerbuster.com/articles.html#Anchor-Suitability-43266 
(last visited April 23, 2006) (providing a long list of items that are helpful for a client looking to 
prove a suitability claim).  But see Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1113, 1154 n.199 (1993) (suggesting that the brokerage firm typically holds 
better access to the necessary documentation). 
167 Booth, supra note 125. 
43
a conclusion about suitability.168 There is tremendous potential for experts to have 
undue influence on arbitrators.  As one Certified Financial Planner put it:  
Unfortunately, too many securities arbitrators today don't know 
what weight an expert's testimony deserves. The picture of the 
arbitrator as a neutral informed person experienced in the securities 
field is a myth.  Some arbitrators apparently have never held a 
brokerage account . . . .  However well-intentioned they are, many 
arbitrators are unable to discern how they are being bamboozled by a 
polished, smooth expert with impeccable credentials.169 
The risk of a mistaken decision is greatly enhanced by the limited information 
experts are forced to provide about their credentials in arbitration relative to 
litigation.  In litigation, an expert must provide a written report prior to trial 
expressing his qualifications and any compensation that he will receive.170 The 
report also must include the opinions the expert will articulate and the rationale and 
data behind any of his opinions.171 Furthermore, any expert expected to present at 
trial must submit to a deposition.172 These pre-litigation procedures provide the 
other side with time to challenge any suspect expert testimony.  Conversely, in 
arbitration none of these initial procedures are required.  The opposing lawyer is 
usually provided with little information about the expert’s credentials or 
 
168 See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure: Composition of Arbitration Panel 6 (2005), 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/nasdw_013098.pdf 
(noting that claims under $50,000 are usually overseen by one arbitrator and claims above 
$50,000 are usually overseen by three arbitrators). 
169 Mason, supra note 34, at 741-42. 
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).   
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).      
172 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4).    
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opinions.173 Even the little information provided about the expert may become 
entirely worthless if arbitrators continue to allow counsel to change experts at the 
last minute.174 In addition, arbitration provides no remedy when arbitrators 
mistakenly accept unreliable or irrelevant expert testimony.175 
Experts have an opportunity to play a major role in arbitration cases in part 
because of the limited experience of arbitrators.  Neither litigation experience nor 
brokerage experience are required to become an arbitrator.  In fact, a majority of 
the arbitrators in a dispute with a client are required to be from outside the 
brokerage industry.176 Arbitrators consist of your typical working professionals.  
The NASD’s goal is “to recruit arbitrators from different backgrounds, such as 
educators, accountants, lawyers, business and securities professionals, and 
 
173 Mason, supra note 34, at 742-43.  
174 Id. at 743.  The objective for arbitration is to speed up the process of litigation, and yet the 
goal is still an accurate result.  NASD Arbitration & Mediation, supra note 31.  When arbitrators 
allow experts to be changed just before a hearing, it prevents opposing counsel from being able 
to effectively cross-examine the expert, and thus get to the truth.  Allowing such flexible rules 
does expedite the process, but the only way this late change of experts can lead to a satisfactory 
result is if the arbitrators and lawyers have a very clear understanding of what goes in to making 
an investment recommendation suitable.   
175 See David A. Gehn, Voir Dire the Silver Bullet to Neutralize “Hired Gun” Testimony of 
“Expert” Witnesses in Securities Arbitration, 1502 PLI/CORP 335, 345 (2005) (noting the 
multiple levels of protection designed to prevent sub-par expert testimony in litigation, all of 
which are not present in arbitration).  Most notably, arbitrators are not trained in the law of 
evidence. 
176 NASD Arbitration & Mediation, http://www.nasd.com (follow “Arbitration & Mediation” 
hyperlink; then follow “Resources for Arbitrators and Mediators” hyperlink; then follow 
“Arbitrator Recruitment” hyperlink; then follow “Frequently Asked Questions About Becoming 
an NASD Arbitrator” hyperlink) (last visited April 23, 2006); see also NASD Arbitration & 
Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (noting that there are currently available 
3,692 public arbitrators and 2,648 industry arbitrators for a combined total of 6,340). 
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others.”177 Furthermore, these professionals do not need to be seasoned veterans.  
The NASD only requires arbitrators to have five years of business or professional 
experience and two years of college-level credits.178 Therefore, even if some 
arbitrators have substantial knowledge and experience, the minimum threshold 
suggests at least some arbitrators may be duped by a sophisticated expert.  
Lastly, the finality of the arbitration process increases the importance of 
getting the decision right.  Arbitration decisions are almost never overturned.179 
The reviewing court cannot overturn a decision it believes to be incorrect or even 
unreasonable.180 Magnifying the concern of an erroneous decision, arbitrators are 
not even required to disclose their reasoning.181 This makes it more challenging 
for the reviewing court to assess the validity of the decision and provides the losing 
party little assurance that the decision was made correctly.182 The court may only 




179 See Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1212 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that 
Section 10 of the Arbitration Act “provides that an award may be vacated if it was procured by 
fraud, corruption or undue means, where there has been evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, where there has been misconduct or misbehavior by which the rights of any party 
may have been prejudiced and where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”); see also Parker, 
supra note 12 (noting that arbitrators may not change their decision even if new evidence 
surfaces and in only very limited circumstances may the decision be vacated). 
180 See James Richardson & Sons v. W. E. Hedger Transportation Corp., 98 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 
1938) (holding the “court is without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement 
with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators”); see also Corey, 691 F.2d at 212.  
181 Parker, supra note 12. 
182 But cf. Katsoris, supra note 166, at 1153 (suggesting the General Accounting Office has 
found no bias towards the brokerage industry in arbitration decisions). 
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unfairness in the proceeding or a misapplication of the law that would be obviously 
recognized by the average arbitrator.183 Still, all of these same drawbacks also 
provide the stated benefits of greater speed and less cost that make arbitration a 
useful alternative to litigation.  Therefore, the underlying message is not that the 
arbitration system needs to be revamped;184 rather, the NASD needs to make it 
easier for arbitrators to accurately interpret the suitability rule and avoid blindly 
relying on experts.    
V.  THE SIMPLE SOLUTION 
The solution to the challenge of making the arbitration process more 
effective in suitability cases is through an easy three-step process.  First, the NASD 
needs to add one simple bullet point to Rule 2310: (d) “A member shall consider 
growth investments when appropriate to help clients’ achieve long-term goals such 
as retirement. Growth investments necessarily include some level of risk.  The 
suitability of every individual growth recommendation shall be analyzed in relation 
to the client’s overall portfolio.”185 
183 See Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(noting that an arbitration award can be reviewed for “misbehavior of the arbitrators or manifest 
disregard of the law”); see also Parker, supra note 12. 
184 But cf. Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to 
Securities Arbitration, 84 N. C. L. REV. 123, 126 (2005) (arguing that “serious reforms are 
necessary in securities arbitration before one can support the claim that this system provides a 
principled alternative to adjudication”). 
185 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also NASD Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) ¶ 
2001, at 2001 (5-89) (Article VII of the NASD By-Laws, Sec. 1.(a)) (stating that “the Board of 
Governors, shall have the authority to: (1) adopt for submission to the membership, as 
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Second, the NASD must require prospective arbitrators to become educated 
on the revised rule before hearing their first suitability case.  Currently, the 
American Arbitration Association [AAA] requires everyone new to the national 
roster of arbitrators to complete general requirements of both an at-home study 
course and a two-day classroom training within six months of signing on to the 
roster.186 Unfortunately, these education requirements mostly focus on the basic 
duties and authority of the arbitrator.187 In addition, the education requirements 
should include more specialized training on the particular subject matter of the 
cases that will be referred to the arbitrators such as suitability.188 The solution 
would be easy because the arbitrators’ suitability education and general education 
requirements could be administered simultaneously.  
 
hereinafter provided, such By-Laws, Rules of Fair Practice and changes or additions thereto as it 
deems necessary or appropriate”) (emphasis added). 
186 AAA Offers New Training for Arbitrators, 55-JAN. DISP. RESOL. J. 5 (Jan. 2001).  See 
generally McCool, supra note 30 at ¶ 46 (stating that according to the NASD, some form of 
general education has been required of new securities arbitrators since 1993).   
187 See AAA Offers New Training for Arbitrators, supra note 186. 
188 See Judith S. Kaye, NEW YORK STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROJECT,
STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, COURT REFERRED ADR IN NY STATE, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUDGE'S NEW YORK STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROJECT 51-53 (May 1, 1996), noted in Lela P. Love & James B. Boskey, Should Mediators 
Evaluate? A Debate Between Lela P. Love, 1 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 1 n.16 
(Dec. 10, 1997) (recommending “a minimum of 8 hours training in the substantive and 
procedural matters related to arbitration of cases in the specific subject area of the case that will 
be referred to them”). 
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Third, the NASD must keep the arbitrators’ understanding of suitability 
fresh through continuing education.189 Fortunately, the AAA already includes a 
continuing education requirement designed to keep arbitrators up to date with any 
revisions to laws that affect arbitration.190 Still, the continuing education needs to 
go deeper than to “acquaint” the arbitrator with the revised rule.191 The arbitrator 
needs enhanced continuing education to acquire a clearer understanding of the 
mental process that the prudent broker goes through before making an investment 
recommendation.  The process of implementing enhanced continuing education 
with respect to suitability should be seamless because the NASD Institute at 
Wharton already offers a course in “Suitability Issues.”192 In addition, continuing 
education could be implemented with minimal cost if the NASD provides 
arbitrators with a video of the class. 
 
189 See id. (suggesting “attendance at continuing education classes of a minimum of 8 hours 
every 2 years”); cf. Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence or Merely Reassuring?  Policy and 
Practice in Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 335, 340-41 (2005) (noting 
that continuing education in mediation is at least as critical to promoting quality as upfront 
certifications and that some state programs require between eight to fifteen hours a year of 
continuing education for mediators). 
190 AAA Offers New Training for Arbitrators, supra note 186.  
191 See id. 
192 See NASD Institute: Suitability Issues I, 
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_006444 
(last visited April 23, 2006).  See generally NASD Institute at Wharton, http://www.nasd.com 
(last visited April 23, 2006) (follow “Education & Programs” hyperlink; then follow “NASD 
Institute” hyperlink) (explaining that NASD classes such as “Suitability Issues” traditionally 
have been offered for individuals looking to become Certified Regulatory and Compliance 
Professionals). 
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The three-step solution will force arbitrators and securities lawyers to 
address the conflicting interests that stockbrokers must weigh when making 
investment recommendations.  The conflicting interests consist of the downside 
risk of losing capital and the risk of not meeting the investor’s future goals such as 
retirement.  Arbitrators will be on alert of these competing forces due to their 
expanded education and the prominence of this new fourth bullet point in the 
concise NASD Rule 2310.193 Securities lawyers will follow suit because they will 
need to prepare to discuss the brokers’ balancing act when arguing a case.  As a 
result of the increased focus on growth investments, all legal professionals will be 
in a better position to assess whether the broker had reasonable grounds, based on 
the client’s financial situation, for any recommendations made to the client.194 
To demonstrate how the solution would apply in practice, consider a 40 year 
old client with only $100,000 saved.  Assume the client cannot afford to save very 
much going forward, can leave the money invested for a minimum of ten years, 
and has the conflicting interests of being risk averse and wanting to retire at 60 
years old.  If the broker invests this client in Treasury notes195 because of their low 
risk, then he should be subject to a suitability claim because the historically low 
 
193 In the absence of the recommended bullet point, arbitrators will likely enter into cases similar 
to this Comment’s hypothetical with the misguided presumption that the client has a winning 
argument.  See supra pp. 15.
194 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8. 
195 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 71, at 1539-40 (defining a treasury note as a 
“debt security issued by the federal government . . . considered risk-free, but . . . [that usually 
pays] relatively little interest”). 
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return of these investments is not in the best interest of his client given that they 
will not help him retire.   
Before the recommended solution, this broker would never even have to 
consider suitability because Treasury notes are very unlikely to result in financial 
loss.196 Furthermore, the securities lawyer and the arbitrator would have laughed at 
this case for the same reason.  Today, once the solution is applied, the client’s 
lawyer will suggest that he bring a suitability claim because the lawyer has heard 
of the changes to NASD Rule 2310.197 The arbitrator hearing the case will 
recognize that this is clearly the type of case that had caused bullet point (d) of 
Rule 2310198 to be added.  The arbitrator’s new education program will have 
enforced this idea in his mind.199 The arbitrator will likely find for the client and 
do so quickly to save everyone additional costs.  This client will be left in a better 
position to retire.  Even more critical, this broker will make sure in the future that 
he and all his broker friends place more emphasis on recommending investments 
that put his clients in a better position to retire. 
VI.  CONCURRENT CLAIMS AND THE SOLUTION APPLIED 
A.  Breach of Fiduciary Duty   
196 Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46.  
197 See supra pp. 46.
198 See supra pp. 46.
199 See supra pp. 47-48. 
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Generally, clients do not just state a cause of action under suitability; they 
also bring interrelated actions.200 Interrelated actions increase the complexity of 
the suitability case, and therefore they may distract arbitrators from focusing on the 
role that growth investments play in broker recommendations.   
For instance, a client may choose to bring a common law claim for a breach 
of fiduciary duty to enhance the strength of his suitability claim.201 When 
applicable, a fiduciary duty requires the stockbroker to act with the utmost good 
faith and integrity.202 A broker owes a fiduciary duty to all clients, but the extent 
of that duty depends on the specific facts of the case.203 Relevant factors include 
the sophistication and experience of the client204 and whether the relationship is 
discretionary or non-discretionary.205 In addition, facts that demonstrate the client 
placed trust in the broker’s expertise will increase the chance that a court will view 
the broker as a fiduciary.206 For instance, in our hypothetical, the client failed to 
 
200 Because suitability claims are typically brought concurrently with other related claims, the 
most realistic approach for applying the recommended solution is in that context.  See NASD 
Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (stating that cases are 
coded to contain up to four controversy types). 
201 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). 
202 Id. at 236. 
203 Root, supra note 120, at 335. 
204 See Roger W. Reinsch, J. Bradley Reich & Nauzer Balsara, Trust Your Broker?: Suitability, 
Modern Portfolio Theory, and Expert Witnesses, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, 185 (2004) 
(stating that the client’s sophistication impacts the level of duty owed by the broker to the client).   
205 See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1217 (8th Cir. 
1990) (noting that discretionary power to makes trades in the client’s account is a factor but not a 
prerequisite for a broker to be subject to a fiduciary duty). 
206 See Twomey, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (suggesting a fiduciary relationship exists whenever the 
client places his faith in the broker). 
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look at his statement for five years.  This fact points towards the view that the 
client had placed complete faith in his broker.    
A breach of fiduciary duty often occurs when a broker has an ongoing 
relationship with a client and fails to address the client’s change in financial 
circumstances or investment objectives.207 Material changes to the client’s 
financial situation must be documented and the broker must re-assess the client’s 
investments for suitability upon learning of the new information.208 For instance, 
returning to our hypothetical, imagine after six months of being invested in the 
aggressive growth mutual funds, you tell your broker that you plan to get married 
within a year and will need $25,000 of the $150,000 investment to pay for the 
wedding.  After learning this information, your broker has a fiduciary obligation to 
review whether either the wedding or the ensuing marriage impacts your 
portfolio’s suitability.209 
Your broker should first inquire whether marriage itself has changed your 
investment goals or desired risk tolerance for your portfolio.210 For instance, you 
may wish to have your investment strategy become more consistent with that of 
 
207 But see Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Company, Inc. 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that a non-discretionary, commission based account ordinarily does not require ongoing 
monitoring or advice on the part of the stockbroker). 
208 Rapp, supra note 5, at 279 n.155. 
209 See State ex rel. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d 126, 130 (Mo. 1995) (noting 
that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage the account in accordance with the client’s 
needs and objectives). 
210 See id. 
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your fiancée’s.211 However, even assuming you do not change your overall 
outlook, the broker must still reassess his recommendations given that you have 
now expressed two contrasting investment objectives: a long-term and a short-term 
goal.212 
Upon analysis, your broker will likely determine that investing $125,000 in 
growth investments still seems to be a wise choice because your long-term goal has 
not changed for these funds.213 As a result, your broker does not necessarily need 
to reallocate the $125,000, and thus he has no new suitability obligations for this 
portion of the portfolio.214 On the other hand, the broker should recognize that 
your objective has changed for the remaining portion of your portfolio.215 You 
have a short-term goal to preserve $25,000 for wedding expenses and thus growth 
investments that were once suitable, now seem to be too risky.216 
211 See Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing, and Beyond: Implications for Workers, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 815, 828 (2002) (noting that studies show women tend to be more conservative 
investors than men). 
212 See Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage 
the account in accordance with the client’s needs and objectives).  
213 See Nenno, supra note 17 accompanying text.  
214 See Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage 
the account in accordance with the client’s needs and objectives). 
215 See id. 
216 Growth investments require a long-term investment horizon.  See Office of General Counsel,
1105 PLI/CORP 13, 168 (1999) (suggesting that the Securities & Exchange Commission [SEC] 
has a “longstanding position that mutual fund shares are generally suitable only as long-term 
investments”).  
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In light of your new financial circumstances, the broker should consider 
selling some of the aggressive mutual funds217 to preserve capital.218 However, it 
is not necessarily true that he must reallocate the portfolio to meet his fiduciary 
obligation.219 This may not even be the wisest strategy.  For instance, before 
selling any of the funds, he should analyze the tax consequences and early 
redemption costs.220 Furthermore, in this case, the broker should consider that 
even without reallocation and regardless of market conditions, you will likely have 
$25,000 at the end of the year to pay for your wedding expenses.221 Thus, paying 
for your wedding does not mandate shifting $25,000 into a capital preservation 
strategy.222 In addition, the broker should take into account whether you are down 
from your initial investment because shifting $25,000 towards capital preservation 
at this time may in fact be taking away from the overall goal of retiring.223 In 
 
217 See id. and accompanying text. 
218 Capital preservation represents one of the investment objectives typically listed on an 
investment questionnaire.  See Rapp, supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
219 See Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage 
the account in accordance with the client’s needs and objectives).  
220 See James N. Benedict, Sean M. Murphy, C. Neil Gray & Carrie A. Bassel, Current 
Developments & Strategies in Litigation Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 1483
PLI/CORP 469, 554 (2005) (discussing how many mutual funds have established early 
redemption fees to discourage short-term trading).   
221 See NASD Rule 2310, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying note 158. 
222 See Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage 
the account in accordance with the client’s needs and objectives).   
223 There is an old adage “buy low, sell high,” which accounts for popular and sophisticated 
investment strategies such as “dollar-cost averaging.”  Dollar-cost averaging refers to 
automatically buying mutual funds at regular intervals to avoid market timing and avoid the risk 
of always buying high.  Telephone Interview with John D. Keller, supra note 55.  In this 
hypothetical, suitability should not mandate that the client sell low if he already bought high.  
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essence, a prudent stockbroker’s recommendation may be that you should not 
change the portfolio at all to stay on track for retirement.224 Thus, arbitrators 
reviewing this hypothetical case should find the broker met his fiduciary duty as 
long as he documented the client’s change in circumstances, regardless of whether 
he suggested changes to the portfolio.225 Because this decision is not intuitive from 
reading the recommended new bullet point of NASD Rule 2310, this analysis 
should be taught to arbitrators through the recommended education program.226 
In contrast to the above hypothetical facts, assume the upcoming wedding 
expenses amounted to a high percentage of the client’s portfolio such that 
aggressive investments risked the client having sufficient funds to pay for the 
wedding.  In that case, arbitrators should find that for the broker to meet his 
fiduciary duty, he must recommend reallocating the majority of the portfolio to 
more suitable short-term investments given the client’s adjusted time horizon.227 
Once again, arbitrators should learn this subtle distinction through the 
recommended education program.228 
The client may be better off waiting out the remaining time that he has left, now that he is 
already entrenched in the growth investments.  Arbitrators need to consider that a broker faced 
with this dilemma who decides not to shift his client’s portfolio from a growth strategy to a more 
conservative strategy may be legitimately concerned about market timing.   
224 See Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that a fiduciary duty requires the broker to manage 
the account in accordance with the client’s needs and objectives).  
225 See id. 
226 See supra Part V.  
227 See Office of General Counsel, supra note 216 and accompanying text.   
228 See supra Part V.  
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The next common method of breaching a fiduciary duty is for the broker to 
fail to monitor the client’s portfolio on an ongoing basis.  In cases of an ongoing 
relationship, the client will often reasonably expect the stockbroker to monitor the 
client’s positions.  In earlier brokerage days, brokers had a major incentive to 
monitor the portfolios because coming up with new positions to sell and buy 
helped them get paid through commissions.229 The transition of the industry from 
a commission based structure into fee based compensation provides the broker 
with different incentives to monitor the portfolio.230 
Under a fee based compensation plan, the broker’s incentive is to increase 
the value of the client’s portfolio which in turn will increase the dollar value 
associated with the broker’s percentage compensation.  For instance, you hire a 
broker to manage your $100,000 portfolio and agree to compensate the broker 
1.5% of the entire portfolio.  In Year One, the broker makes 1.5% of $100,000 or 
$1,500.  After the first year, the value of your portfolio increases to $110,000.  
Now, in Year Two, the broker has increased his compensation to 1.5% of $110,000 
or $1,650.  This example demonstrates that stockbrokers and clients are on the 
same side under fee based compensation plans.  However, paradoxically, that does 
not mean that the broker has a significant enough incentive that he will actively 
 
229 But cf. M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 795 F.2d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 1986) (defining 
churning as “excessive [trading] in light of the customer’s investment objectives”).  
230 See Patricia C. Foster, Fee-Based Accounts: The Broker’s Role Determines the Rule, 1503
PLI/CORP 189, 191 (2005) (noting the dramatic transition in the structure of broker’s 
compensation that has taken place in the past twenty five years). 
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monitor your portfolio.  The reason for this paradox is that there is an opportunity 
cost for the broker in monitoring your diversified portfolio rather than utilizing that 
time to solicit new business.   
On the one hand, the incentive to closely monitor your portfolio is minimal 
because active portfolio management has not proven to significantly outperform 
simple passively managed strategies such as index funds.231 Conversely, the 
incentive for soliciting new business is high because stockbrokers can utilize 
similar investment strategies with each new client that they add on.  A broker will 
often choose to spend his time soliciting new business because a newly acquired 
client allows him to increase revenues with little exertion of energy.  These 
developments in the brokerage industry provide another opportunity for the 
recommended education program to provide arbitrators with the necessary 
background knowledge to make an informed decision in a suitability case.232 
B.  Related Causes of Action 
 There are a couple of additional claims that clients will often bring in 
conjunction with suitability claims and their relevance should be explained in the 
continuing education program.233 First, the client will likely bring a claim for 
 
231 See W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Note, Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Prudent 
Investment Under The Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 335, 344 (1997) 
(noting that actively managed investment strategies rarely outperform passively managed 
strategies). 
232 See supra Part V. 
233 Id. 
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failure to supervise against the brokerage firm, unless the case clearly involves a 
broker deviating from the standard practices of the firm.234 However, the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide brokerage 
firms with safe harbor provisions under which the firm is not held responsible if 
the firm acted in good faith, had no knowledge or reasonable ground to believe in 
the facts that would otherwise make it liable, or followed established supervisory 
procedures reasonably expected to be effective.235 These safe harbors put the 
brokerage firm at odds with the stockbroker, and yet the same lawyer often 
represents both parties.236 This conflict of interest, combined with the focus on 
financial loss in suitability cases,237 serves as a major disincentive for the broker 
who desires to help his client retire by recommending the necessary level of 
growth for his portfolio.   
 Second, clients sometimes bring a common law cause of action for 
negligence.  Negligence alone does not suffice for a client to have a valid cause of 
action, but it may be brought concurrently with a suitability claim, and may serve 
 
234 See NASD Arbitration & Mediation: Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 12 (listing 
“failure to supervise” as one of the interrelated controversies in arbitration cases). 
235 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2002); see also Pete S. Michaels & Derek C. Anderson, A Case 
Study of Two Hedge Funds: A Regulatory Framework and Its Lessons for the Broker-Dealer 
Litigator, 1503 PLI/CORP 259, 270 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2005)). 
236 R. Gina Renee, How to Survive in Arbitration Nation, available at 
http://www.researchxtra.com/uploads/features/2006/0601_fs_cover_arbitration.asp (last visited 
April 23, 2006) (quoting Thomas O’Keefe, President of the National Association of Investment 
Professionals: “Brokers getting sued like this think that their firm’s attorney represents them: 
They need to realize that the big firms . . . are the defense attorney’s customer . . . ”).  
237 Elisofon & Elkins, supra note 43, at 34; see also supra text accompanying note 46. 
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as evidence of whether the broker was reasonable under NASD 2310.238 Although 
actual negligence provides evidence of a broker’s wrongdoing, arbitrators and 
lawyers may mistakenly believe the broker was negligent when the broker was 
merely factoring in the client’s need for growth.239 
VII.  DAMAGES 
Once a client proves that a stockbroker has made unsuitable 
recommendations, the arbitrators must decide how much to assess in damages. 
Section 28a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 limits recovery to actual 
damages.240 The main theory for assessing damages for suitability actions is the 
out of pocket model241 which compensates the client for the actual losses sustained 
during the time the client held unsuitable investments.242 Unfortunately, this 
method does not accurately assess the client’s true damages because actual losses 
do not equate to actual damages.   
In many cases, regardless of whether the client made or lost money, the 
broker will have made unsuitable investments because he departed in some manner 
from the appropriate asset allocation model.  However, the out of pocket model 
fails to take this into account because it does not consider market appreciation or 
 
238 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 697 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 
(D.D.C.1988).  
239 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
240 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).  
241 The theory is also known as the recissory model. 
242 See generally Miner, supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
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depreciation.  The theory compensates the client for all losses, not just those 
attributable to the unsuitable investments.  As a result, clients that lose money due 
to unsuitable investments are often over-compensated under this approach. 
Another strategy for assessing damages that has been proposed is the loss of 
bargain recovery model which compensates a client for the money that he would 
have earned had the money not been mismanaged.243 Regrettably, the reluctance to 
consider market performance in assessing damages has led to the concern that 
bargain theory recovery damages are too speculative.244 Although some courts 
have acknowledged the possibility that clients could be entitled to lost profits 
under the right circumstances, 245 few courts have awarded damages under the loss 
of bargain theory.246 Therefore, clients that receive recommendations that are too 
conservative based on their investment objectives may not have a legal recourse to 
obtain adequate compensation.  This problem may arise even in cases where the 
broker’s unsuitable recommendations kept the clients from meeting their future 
needs.   
 
243 See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor, and Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849 (4th Cir. 1968) (arguing 
that the bargain recovery model is too speculative). 
244 See McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(finding that if damages were not too speculative, then the loss of bargain theory could be 
invoked).  
245 See Smith v. Fahnestock & Co., Inc., 2002 WL 334511 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying the 
plaintiff’s request for summary judgment in a suitability case even though the client had received 
gains in his portfolio). 
246 See Krull v. SEC, 248 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming a decision to compensate clients 
for lost profits due to unsuitable recommendations, despite the injured clients having gains in 
their account). 
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Despite the fear that intertwining damages with the stock market is too 
speculative, market indexes should help provide specific measures that can be tied 
to the proper asset allocation.  Index returns are published, and thus no speculation 
is involved in obtaining these figures.  It is true that the proper asset allocation for 
the client may be hard to distinguish between fine lines such as aggressive, and 
moderately aggressive.  However, experts can make recommendations of the 
appropriate asset allocation level and arbitrators can ultimately make that 
decision.247 The fair level of damages for all cases in which recommending asset 
allocation was appropriate should be the difference, over the apt time period, 
between the client’s actual market performance and the appropriate index’s 
performance as determined by the arbitrators.248 For example, if the arbitration 
board determines that the client’s proper asset allocation would have been 
approximately a 50% equity and 50% bond portfolio, then pre-determined equity 
and bond indexes should be utilized to calculate the client’s portfolio had it been 
invested properly.  
An award for damages should put the client back in the position he would 
have been in had the broker provided suitable recommendations instead of the 
 
247 Arbitrators will be less likely to be “bamboozled” by experts once they have a clearer 
understanding of the role of growth investments.  See supra Part V (providing three steps that 
will increase arbitrators’ understanding). 
248 See Miner, supra note 16, at 841 (concluding, wisely, that damages should also factor in 
dividend activity, cash withdrawals, and cash deposits). 
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unsuitable recommendations.249 This approach implies that it should not make a 
difference whether the client lost or made money in the market.  The question 
merely becomes what was the deviation in performance between the unsuitable 
portfolio and a properly managed portfolio.  Therefore, there should be no 
distinction between the out of pocket model and the loss of bargain model, but 
rather one model that assesses market performance in relation to the client’s actual 
returns.  Yet again, the recommended education program can explain to arbitrators 
the process for accurately assessing damages.250 
VIII.  CONCLUSION   
 Growth investments refer to a wide variety of equity strategies all designed 
for a client to achieve higher portfolio performance, while taking on some risk.  A 
prudent stockbroker utilizes growth investments to help clients meet future needs 
such as the universal, yet challenging, goal of retirement.  When growth 
investments are utilized in relation to a diversified strategy and meet a client’s 
objectives, a supervisor at a brokerage firm will often find the investments to be 
suitable.   
 Accordingly, arbitrators should focus on the need for growth in clients’ 
portfolios when evaluating the suitability of investments and interrelated claims 
 
249 See generally id. at 839-40 (stating that in 10b-5 actions damages should place the client in 
the position he would have been in had the fraud not occurred). 
250 See supra Part V.  
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such as breach of fiduciary duty.  The importance of growth investments may not 
only explain how prudent advice led to a client’s financial loss, but it also may 
help arbitrators understand why the broker might have felt there was a need to take 
on some risk in the first place.     
 In addition, lawyers serving as advocates in arbitration proceedings have a 
duty to emphasize the need for growth investments in their arguments when 
appropriate.  Securities lawyers should recognize that brokerage firms may have a 
valid defense that the recommended investments were proper in light of the client’s 
need for growth in his portfolio.  On the other hand, lawyers should advise 
prospective clients that they are not limited to bringing suitability cases for 
financial loss.  Lawyers should inform clients that they may also have a case when 
they indicated a preference for growth and their investments were allocated too 
conservatively.   
 In any case, the speed and finality of the arbitration process and the 
inexperience of arbitrators make it especially important for all legal professionals 
working in the securities industry to have a clear understanding of the need for 
growth in a client’s portfolio.  This clear understanding is necessary to avoid the 
otherwise inevitable misapplication of liability and damages in suitability cases.  
Therefore, the NASD should add a bullet point to the suitability rule.  It would 
clarify how the need to invest for growth impacts whether a broker had reasonable 
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grounds to make a particular recommendation.  In addition, the NASD should take 
steps to ensure that arbitrators familiarize themselves with the applications of this 
rule.  Ultimately, if arbitrators determine the recommended investments were 
unsuitable given the client’s circumstances and investment objectives, damages 
should be assessed in relation to the appropriate market index, regardless of 
whether the client’s portfolio increased or decreased in value.      
